کاظمی‌مرشت، پ. و عراقی‌نژاد، ش. 1394. تخصیص آب با استفاده از مدل شکار- شکارچی و مقایسه آن با روش‌های مرسوم حل اختلاف (مطالعه موردی: حوضه آبریز اترک). مجله آب و فاضلاب، 5(26): 3-13.
میرشفیعی، س.، انصاری، ح. و میان‌آبادی، ح.1394. روش‌های نظریه ورشکستگی در تخصیص منابع آبی مشترک (مطالعه موردی: رودخانه اترک). نشریه آبیاری و زهکشی ایران، 4(9): 604-594.
وزارت نیرو، دفتر برنامه‌ریزی کلان آب و آبفا، گزارش مطالعات بهنگام‌سازی طرح جامع آب کشور- حوضه آبریز اترک.
Aumann R.J. and Maschler M. 1985. Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud. Journal of Economic Theory, 36(2): 195-213.
Ansink E. and Weikard H.P. 2012. Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems. Social Choice and Welfare, 38(2): 187–210.
Curiel S., Canto J. and Rodriguez L. 1987. A model for the thermal radio continuum emission produced by a shock wave and its application to the Herbig-Haro objects 1 and 2. Revista mexicana de astronomía y astrofísica, 14: 595-602.
Dagan N. and Volji O. 1993. The bankruptcy problem: A cooperative approach. Mathematical Social Sciences, 26(3): 287-297.
Degefu D.M., He W., Yuan L. and Zhoa J.H. 2016. water allocation in transboundary river basins under water scarcity: a cooperative bargaining approach. Water Resources Management, 30(12): 4451-4466.
Fisher F.M., Arlosoroff S., Eckstein Z., Haddadin M., Hamati S.G., Huber-Lee A., Jarrar A., Jayyousi A., Shamir U. and Wesseling H. 2002. Optimal water management and conflict resolution: The Middle East Water Project. Water resources research, 38(11):321-337.
Gallastegui M.C., Inarra E. and Prellezo R. 2003. Bankruptcy of Fishing Resources: The Northern European Anglerfish Fishery. Marine Resource Economics, 17(4): 291–307.
Harsanyi J.C. 1982. A simplified bargaining model for the n-person cooperative game. In: Harsanyi JC (ed) Papers in game theory, Springer, Netherlands, 260(28): 45-70.
Herinckx H.A., Swart S.C., Ama S.M., Dolezal C.D. and King S. 2005. Rearrest and linkage to mental health services among clients of the Clark County mental health court program. Psychiatr Serv, 56: 853–857.
Kucukmehmetoglu M. and Guldmen J .2004. International Water Resources Allocation and Conflicts: the Case of the Euphrates and Tigris. Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space, 36(5):783-801.
Madani K. and Zarezadeh M. 2012. Bankruptcy methods for resolving water resources conflicts. In: Loucks, D.P. (Ed.), World Environmental and Water ResourcesCongress 2012. American Society of Civil Engineers, 3: 2247- 2252.
Mianabadi H., Mostert E., Zarghami M. and Giesen N. 2013. Transboundary water resources allocation using bankruptcy theory; Case Study of euphrates and tigris rivers. "Transboundary Water Management across borders and interfaces: present and future challenges" Conference, Aveiro, Portugal.
Nash Z. 1950. The bargaining problem. Econometrica, 18(2): 155–162.
Nash Z .1953. Two-person cooperative games. Jornal Of Econometrica Society, 21(1): 128–140.
O’Neill B. 1982. A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud. Mathematical Social Sciences, 2(4): 345–371.
Roozbahani R., Schreider S. and Abbasi B. 2015. Optimal water allocation through a multi-objective compromise etween environmental, social, and economic preferences. Environ. Model. Softw, 64: 18–30.
Wolf A.T. 1999. Criteria for equitable allocations: the heart of international water conflict. Natural Resources, 23(1): 3-30.
Wu Q.L. and Xu N.R. 1996. Improved interactive methods of multi-objective decision-making based on targetsatisfaction degree. Journal of Management in Engineering, 4: 217–222.
Zarezadeh M., Madani K. and Morid S. 2012. Resolving transboundary water conflicts: lessons learned from the Qezelozan-Sefidrood river bankruptcy problem. World Environmental And Water Resources Congress. Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA.
Zarghami M., and Szidarovszky F. 2011. Multi criteria Analysis Applications to Water and Environment Management, Springer Science & Business Media, Berlin, Germany.
)
ارسال نظر در مورد این مقاله